12 min read<\/p>\n
8 Min. Read<\/span><\/p>\n About one in four transformations delivers lasting value. The average CEO tenure drops to 7.1 years, a record low. The window for transformation is narrowing. Still, there are CEOs who succeed: Miguel Lopez transformed ThyssenKrupp from a company in need of restructuring to a holding company with a \u20ac6.2 billion IPO in just two years. Infineon evolved from the Qimonda insolvency to a $57 billion semiconductor giant in 16 years. Continental is splitting into three focused companies. What connects these turnarounds: CEOs who don’t optimize but think radically new. They destroy what’s existing to make room for something better. And they act faster than their predecessors thought possible.<\/strong><\/p>\n Miguel Lopez took over ThyssenKrupp in June 2023. A company that had been oscillating between restructuring and stagnation for years, with a steel division that was burning through billions and a corporate structure that no longer convinced anyone. What Lopez has done in two years is a masterclass in radical portfolio transformation.<\/p>\n The core decision: ThyssenKrupp will no longer be an integrated industrial group. Lopez is transforming the company into a financial holding with majority stakes in independent companies. His “ACES 2030” strategy is breaking up the company into standalone units that can operate faster and more focused under their own leadership and brand than under the ThyssenKrupp umbrella.<\/p>\n The most spectacular move: the TKMS IPO on October 20, 2025. The marine subsidiary was listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange at a starting price of \u20ac60 and rose to almost \u20ac100 on the first day. The peak valuation of \u20ac6.2 billion temporarily exceeded the market capitalization of the parent company. ThyssenKrupp retains 51 percent, but cashes in on the IPO proceeds and proves to the market: the parts are worth more than the whole.<\/p>\n In the steel sector, Lopez makes the toughest decision: 11,000 out of 27,000 jobs will be cut by 2030. Production capacity is being reduced from 11.5 to 8.7-9.0 million tons. In December 2024, he concludes a collective bargaining agreement with the IG Metall union: 77 percent approval, no layoffs due to operational reasons until 2030. This is not a clear-cut, but a negotiated downsizing. The difference between transformation and insolvency.<\/p>\n The numbers confirm the course: in the 2024\/25 financial year, adjusted EBIT rose by 13 percent to \u20ac640 million, despite a 6 percent decline in revenue to \u20ac32.8 billion. Free cash flow before M&A jumped from \u20ac110 million to \u20ac363 million, the third consecutive positive year. Lopez has had his contract extended until May 2031. The board trusts him to complete the transformation.<\/p>\n Infineon’s story is proof that turnarounds are not a sprint discipline. In January 2009, its subsidiary Qimonda filed for insolvency: 13,500 employees, billions in losses, and the end of the DRAM business. Infineon itself stood on the brink of collapse. The revenue of the Qimonda division had plummeted from 3.61 to 1.79 billion Euro.<\/p>\n What followed was a strategic cleanup that completely redefined the group. 2009: sale of the Wireline division to Golden Gate Capital for 250 million Euro. 2011: sale of the Wireless business to Intel for 1.4 billion dollars. Infineon reduced itself to its core business: power semiconductors, automotive chips, and security controllers.<\/p>\n Under CEO Reinhard Ploss (2012 to 2022), the growth phase began. The “Product to System” strategy positioned Infineon not as a component manufacturer but as a system partner for the automotive industry, energy transition, and IoT. Two acquisitions defined the path: International Rectifier for 3 billion dollars (2014\/2015) and Cypress Semiconductor for 9.4 billion dollars (2019\/2020). Both were bets that power electronics and automotive semiconductors are the future markets.<\/p>\n The bet paid off. Record revenue in 2023: 16.3 billion Euro. Market capitalization<\/a> in March 2026: around 57 billion dollars. From Qimonda’s insolvency to becoming a global top 10 semiconductor manufacturer in 16 years. That’s not a quick fix. That’s strategic patience combined with bold acquisitions.<\/p>\n Jochen Hanebeck, CEO since April 2022, continues the course. Ploss now sits on the supervisory board of Deutsche Telekom, where he brings his semiconductor expertise to the digital board governance. The turnaround has not only transformed a company but created a network of executives that strengthens the German business location.<\/p>\n Nikolai Setzer, CEO since December 2020, has split Continental into three parts. Not because the group has failed, but because he recognized that focused companies act better than diversified ones. His own formulation: “Flexible, focused companies can seize opportunities better than complex organizations.” He called it, in effect, “the most far-reaching realignment in the company’s history”.<\/p>\n The steps: In December 2024, the board decision<\/a> on the automotive spin-off was made. In April 2025, the new brand “Aumovio” was presented at Auto Shanghai. In September 2025, Aumovio was listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange: an independent automotive technology company with its own management, strategy, and capital market access.<\/p>\n “Flexible, focused companies can seize opportunities better than complex organizations.”<\/p>\n Nikolai Setzer, CEO Continental<\/p>\n<\/div>\n In parallel, the sale of the ContiTech business is ongoing. ContiTech OESL was sold to Regent in February 2026. For the remaining ContiTech segment, a structured sales process has been underway since January 2026. The special effects in 2025: 1.718 billion Euro. That’s the price of transformation. But the market has reacted: the sum of the individual units is valued higher than the integrated group.<\/p>\n The Boston Consulting Group<\/a> investigated in 2024 what distinguishes successful transformations from failed ones. The results are both sobering and enlightening.<\/p>\n Around 26 percent of all transformations deliver sustainable value. Two-thirds fail completely. But there are clear patterns among the winners. Firstly, proactive transformations (before external crises force them) reduce the likelihood of a CEO change by 4.7 percentage points. Lopez at ThyssenKrupp and Setzer at Continental both acted proactively before the market forced them to.<\/p>\n Secondly, a leadership change during the transformation brings 4.1 percentage points more Total Shareholder Return over five years. External CEOs nearly double this effect. Lopez came from outside (previously Aurubis). Ploss was internal but from a different division. The distance from the existing setup helps.<\/p>\n Thirdly, and this is surprising: One year after the start of the transformation, 70 percent of the stock performance comes from changed investor expectations, not from real efficiency gains. Communicating the strategy is just as important as its implementation. Lopez perfectly staged this with the TKMS IPO: a symbol for the new direction that the market immediately understood.<\/p>\n The average CEO tenure is dropping to a record low. According to BCG and Russell Reynolds, it was 7.1 years for departing CEOs globally in the first half of 2025, down from 7.7 years in H1 2024. In the DAX-40, the average is 8.4 years according to Russell Reynolds. This means a CEO has more runway than often assumed, but only 3 to 5 years to initiate, implement, and demonstrate results from a transformation.<\/p>\n The three cases show different time horizons. Lopez took 2 years to take TKMS public, but the steel restructuring will last until 2030. Ploss transformed Infineon over 10 years, a timeframe that today’s boards can hardly grant. Setzer took 4 years from taking office to the spin-off decision.<\/p>\n The median: 3 to 5 years for structural results. This barely fits within a DAX CEO’s tenure, but only if the CEO knows what they want to do from day one. Those who spend the first 12 months on analysis and stakeholder management have only 3 to 4 years left for implementation. In a world where AI cycles are measured in months and regulatory deadlines (NIS2, AI Act, CSRD) are fixed, this is often not enough.<\/p>\n Heidelberger Druckmaschinen shows the other side. The debt reduction from 250 to 43 million Euro net debt in 2020 was impressive. The focus on packaging printing and digitalization was strategically correct. But CEO Ludwin Monz stepped down in June 2024, after just two years in office. The EBITDA margin of 7.1 percent is solid but not outstanding. The stock price has not recovered.<\/p>\n And ThyssenKrupp Steel is still searching for a solution. The planned sale to Jindal Steel is stalled. The 11,000 job losses are real. And not all shareholders agree that a financial holding is the right structure for an industrial conglomerate.<\/p>\n The lesson: Transformation is no guarantee of success. It’s a prerequisite for not going under. But even proactive and well-planned transformations fail in 75 percent of cases. What distinguishes the 25 percent winners: speed, clarity of communication, and the willingness to make painful decisions without delay.<\/p>\n 1. Make decisions within the first 100 days.<\/strong> Lopez communicated his “ACES 2030” strategy early on. Setzer didn’t delay the spin-off decision. Those who wait<\/a> lose momentum and credibility. The first 100 days determine whether the CEO is perceived as a transformer or an administrator.<\/p>\n 2. Take symbolic actions.<\/strong> The TKMS IPO was not just a transaction. It was a signal to the market, employees, and the supervisory board: this CEO is serious. Symbolic actions (a sale, an IPO, a radical strategy shift) communicate more than any strategy presentation.<\/p>\n 3. Concentrate, rather than distribute, the pain.<\/strong> ThyssenKrupp is cutting 11,000 jobs, but in one area (steel) and with a clear timeline (by 2030). This is tough for those affected, but manageable for the organization. Worse is “death by a thousand cuts”: saving a little everywhere, changing nothing significantly anywhere.<\/p>\n 4. Plan IT separation from the start.<\/strong> Continental booked 1.718 billion Euro in special effects, a significant portion of which was for IT separation. Those planning a carve-out<\/a> without separating their SAP landscape lose months and millions in due diligence.<\/p>\n The German turnaround cases from 2023 to 2026 show a pattern: successful CEOs don’t optimize; they dismantle and rebuild. Lopez is breaking up ThyssenKrupp into a holding company. Ploss transformed Infineon through strategic streamlining and bold acquisitions. Setzer is splitting Continental into three focused champions. The BCG data confirms that 75 percent fail. But the 25 percent who succeed act proactively, communicate clearly, and don’t shy away from pain. In a Germany organizing its economic reboot, these CEOs are the key players \u2013 not because they’re right, but because they take action.<\/p>\n 3 to 5 years for structural results. Lopez took 2 years for the TKMS IPO, but the steel restructuring will last until 2030. Infineon took 10 years. The average CEO tenure of 7.1 years (global) and 8.4 years (DAX-40, Russell Reynolds 2025) sets narrow limits. Anyone who doesn’t act in the first year has too little runway.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n According to BCG, there are three main reasons: Firstly, a lack of speed (too much analysis, too little implementation). Secondly, unclear communication (employees and the market don’t understand the direction). Thirdly, half-hearted measures (saving a bit everywhere instead of radical restructuring). External CEOs perform better because they have less emotional attachment to the existing situation.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n No. A spin-off works when the parts have different capital requirements, market cycles, or growth rates. Continental Automotive vs. ContiTech is a clear case. But a spin-off comes at a cost: Continental booked 1.7 billion Euro in special effects. The IT separation alone can take months. Anyone who underestimates the complexity pays double.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Three things: Firstly, speed (TKMS IPO in under two years after taking office). Secondly, clarity (ThyssenKrupp becomes a holding company, not a conglomerate). Thirdly, focused pain (11,000 jobs in steel, but with collective bargaining agreements and social plans instead of a slash-and-burn approach). His contract was extended until 2031, a vote of confidence from the supervisory board.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Three principles can be applied: Firstly, portfolio clarity (which business areas are core, which are not?). Secondly, decision-making speed (SMEs have the advantage of short paths, but must use it). Thirdly, external perspective (involving an advisory board or interim manager who is allowed to question the existing situation).<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Portfolio Transformation 2026: Carve-outs and M&A<\/a> (Digital Chiefs)<\/p>\n CIO Reboot: 245 billion and the question where the money flows<\/a> (Digital Chiefs)<\/p>\n SME M&A: Why 2026 will be the decisive year<\/a> (MyBusinessFuture)<\/p>\n Reboot Germany: 735 billion investments<\/a> (MyBusinessFuture)<\/p>\n Source title image: Pexels \/ fauxels (px:3184418)<\/em><\/p>\n 12 min read 8 Min. Read About one in four transformations delivers lasting value. The average CEO tenure drops to 7.1 years, a record low. The window for transformation is narrowing. Still, there are CEOs who succeed: Miguel Lopez transformed ThyssenKrupp from a company in need of restructuring to a holding company with a \u20ac6.2 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":12946,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_yoast_wpseo_focuskw":"leadership","_yoast_wpseo_title":"Leadership: Guide CEOs through major business transformations","_yoast_wpseo_metadesc":"Leadership in transformation: Learn how CEOs can drive successful change from ThyssenKrupp, Infineon, and Continental. Discover strategies to deliver lasting value\u2014read now.","_yoast_wpseo_opengraph-image":"","_yoast_wpseo_opengraph-image-id":0,"_yoast_wpseo_twitter-image":"","_yoast_wpseo_twitter-image-id":0,"featured_post_sortierung":0,"featured_post":0,"pre_headline":"","bildquelle":"","teasertext":"","language":"de","_evm_translation_lang":"","_wp_old_slug":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[694,673],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14872","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-new-work-leadership","category-reboot-germany","entry"],"wpml_language":"en","wpml_translation_of":12947,"yoast_head":"\nKey Takeaways<\/h2>\n
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ThyssenKrupp: How Lopez is dismantling and reassembling the company<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Infineon: Germany’s Longest Corporate Turnaround<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Continental: The Most Far-Reaching Realignment<\/strong><\/h2>\n
What BCG data reveals about turnaround leadership<\/strong><\/h2>\n
The time window is narrowing<\/strong><\/h2>\n
The honest counterposition: Not every turnaround succeeds<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Four Principles for Transformation CEOs<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Frequently Asked Questions<\/strong><\/h2>\n
How long does a typical CEO turnaround take?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
Why do 75 percent of transformations fail?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
Is a spin-off always the right answer?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
What does Lopez do differently at ThyssenKrupp than his predecessors?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
What can SMEs learn from DAX turnarounds?<\/strong><\/summary>\n
Further Reading<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Read more<\/h3>\n
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